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China: Unfulfilled Promise
Michael Gernes
ABSTRACT. At the turn of the first millennium A.D. the Chinese empire was perhaps the
most technologically and economically advanced civilization on the planet. Economic
historians continue to wonder why China stopped progressing along a path which seemed
to promise an industrial revolution similar to that experienced by the West. This paper
examines how the social and political institutions which made pre-industrial China
different from Europe may have prevented such a revolution from happening. The
imperial bureaucracy, Confucian philosophy and the centralized nature of the empire all
played a role in preventing China from escaping the pre-modern world until the 20th
century.

I. Introduction
The year was 1841. Britain had recently declared war on the Chinese
empire to defend the right of her merchants to sell opium to the Chinese
people in exchange for the tea which the British craved. To historians,
this conflict became known as the first Opium War, but much more was
at stake than just the Asian drug trade [Headrick, 1981, 44-46].
For the first time, a European power had directly challenged the
power and authority of the Celestial Empire, as China referred to itself.
Since the 16th century, European merchants had sailed to China to humbly
petition and sometimes beg the Chinese for the opportunity to trade for
the silks, spices and other goods which Europe wanted [Landes, 1998,
334-339]. The Chinese court and the Chinese emperor (the Son of
Heaven) had given audiences and entertained these visitors, but had never
completely opened the empire up to the European trade requests. Apart
from a few small trading enclaves like Macao, which had been given to
the Portuguese, China was a closed society [Elvin, 1973, 215-229].
The latest Europeans to be turned away were the British missions to
China under Lord Macartney in 1793 and Lord Amherst in 1813
[Headrick, 1981, 44]. The British, aware of their power at sea and their
growing technological domination, were tired of begging. By 1841, a
fleet of wooden-hulled British men of war lay off the Chinese coast. Up
to this point in history, China had been virtually invulnerable to attack
from the European “barbarians.” Europe’s strength was in its navies, and
no sailing ship could make it up the Yangtze delta. Even if they could,
China had an enormous army [Headrick, 1981, 43].
35

34

Major Themes in Economics, Spring 2001

The industrial revolution had changed the rules, however. Armed
British steamboats towed the larger sailing ships into position to attack
the stone-walls of the “Bogue” forts protecting the entrance to the Pearl
river at Canton. The warships’ powerful lanyard-operated guns raked the
forts, and British marines stormed ashore, some of them armed with the
latest percussion-cap muskets which fired even in the rain. They received
fire support from the gunboats, which were able to steam close inshore
and bombard Chinese boats and troops with rockets and rifled cannon
[Headrick, 1981, 49-54].
The Chinese soldiers defending the world’s greatest (and once
richest) land empire fired cannon cast two centuries earlier from behind
the old-fashioned straight stone walls of their forts. They were armed
with swords and pikes and wore armor and shields made for an earlier
day. The luckier troops carried gingals, rudimentary muskets mounted on
tripods which required two men to operate. Chinese war junks were one
tenth the tonnage of the British ships of the line; most hung back in the
river mouth. Some of them fired cannons, but others attempted to close
with the British and fling burning pots of pitch onto their ships. They
were crushed or captured [Headrick, 1981, 49-54].
Within a year, the British fleet had forced its way into the network
of canals which China depended on for its internal grain transportation.
It was checkmate for the Celestial Empire. The British imposed terms
often described as humiliating upon a once-proud civilization and the
drug trade continued [Headrick, 1981, 49-53].
The terrific irony is that things did not have to happen this way.
Picture this story from the opposite perspective: the forces of the Chinese
navy sailing up the Thames river and laying siege to London sometime
during the 18th century. Although it wouldn’t have happened, since
Britain would never have been a great prize to the Chinese, it could have.
Eight centuries before the Opium War, it was China which led the world
in nearly all fields of technology and was the richest nation on the planet.
Many scholars believe that China could have become industrialized
as early as the 14th century, yet the empire did not [Mokyr, 1990, 218219]. So why didn’t this happen? Why did China fall behind Europe
when it seemingly had all the advantages?
Technological slowdown and lethargy seem to be the main reasons.
What happened to the rate of invention and innovation in China when this
would have made possible the capital improvements underlying an

Gernes: China - Unfulfilled Promise

35

industrial society? Why didn’t the Chinese make use of the potentially
labor-saving inventions that their tinkerers and savants came up with?
These are very important questions. They have everything to do with how
correct economic theories about long-term macro-economic growth are.
They also has to do with the role that socio-political institutions play in
that same economic growth. Finally, it has to do with technology, which
economists believe to be the driving factor behind the modern world’s
ability to keep productivity ahead of population growth.
Hard answers are extremely elusive, but they seem to lie in the very
institutions which defined the Celestial Empire. The Chinese bureaucracy
and worldview which provided stability and longevity to Chinese
civilization may also have held the seeds of China’s ultimate failure to
meet its early promise. There is little certainty here, but certainly both
were very important factors.

II. A Background in Chinese History
THE FABRIC OF CHINESE CIVILIZATION
To discuss Chinese civilization in an economic context it would be
desirable for the reader to have at least a rudimentary background in the
subject. It is impossible to encapsulate the complete tapestry of Chinese
history in just a few pages. Unfortunately, space constraints require that
I focus on a few points where Chinese civilization relates to economics.
The basic elements of what we today call “China” started to come
together during the Chinese iron age, coalescing during what historians
call the Warring States period [Roberts, 1999, 7-8]. As the name implies,
the era was characterized by warfare between what were essentially
independent kingdoms. They had once been loosely knit together by the
ancient Zhou kingdom, a bronze age civilization which had lasted from
1122 BC to 256 BC.
The Zhou order had deteriorated during its Spring and Autumn
period (which is named after The Spring and Autumn Annals written
around that time). The iron age had arrived in China during the Spring
and Autumn period, but the spread of iron technology came to full
fruition during the Warring States period. This resulted in dramatic
changes in China. The spread of metal tools and fertilizer techniques in
agriculture and growth in trade brought an increase in economic output
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and allowed China to support specialist classes and for states to become
more organized. [Roberts, 1999, 12-13].
War in the earlier Zhou period had been an activity for an elite
nobility who were often mounted on chariots, which were the pre-eminent
war machine of the bronze age. In the Warring States period, wars were
fought by large armies (some as large as 600,000) made up of
infantrymen who were conscripted into service by the state.
These armies were armed with the latest weapons of the day,
including the crossbow (a weapon not to be seen in Europe until hundreds
of years later), iron swords and armor. These armies were often led by
professional generals like Sun Tzu, who wrote his famous Art of War
during the fifth century BC [Roberts, 1999, 13-15]. The patterns laid
down here would continue to characterize warfare throughout the rest of
pre-modern Chinese history.
The Warring States period and its political climate also gave birth
to one of the most vital and enduring components of Chinese civilization.
A government official in the northeastern state of Wei named Kong Fuzi
(known as Confucius in the west) came to hold the conviction that these
were troubled times requiring enlightened government. He believed these
principles could be found in writings about the leaders of the early Zhou
period, which he regarded as a golden age [Roberts, 1999, 14].
Confucius thought the Zhou leaders had “followed the tao, or Way,
which in this context meant the Way of running a state so that good order
and harmony can prevail among men’” [Roberts, 1999, 14]. In addition
to ruling with benevolence and promoting the general welfare of the
people, Confucius felt that leaders should strive for the ideal of the well
educated, self-cultivated “gentleman.” He also stressed the importance
of “filial piety,” or respect and duty to one’s family, especially one’s
elders. Over the course of his life, his teachings attracted a devoted
following who collected his sayings after his death, compiling them in the
first work of Confucian literature: the Analects [Roberts, 1999, 14-15].
Confucian thought became codified in the following three centuries
and a body of literature began to emerge which formed the basis of
classical Chinese education. It included not only writings attributed to
Confucius, but writings from the Shang and Zhou periods (including The
Spring and Autumn Annals) and works regarding classical Chinese
cosmology like the famous book of divination, the I Ching [Roberts,
1999, 18-19]. Confucian philosophy, however, would not be the only
strain of thought to come out of or affect China.
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Taoism was the second major school of philosophy to emerge from
the time of the Warring States. The Lao Tzu, which was written in the
fourth century BC, lays out its major ideas. Lao Tzu is a compilation
attributed to a semi-mythical writer of the same name, who current
historians think may never have existed [Roberts, 1999, 16-17].
Taoism was focused on the concept of “the Way” mentioned by
Confucius, but the two philosophies were very different. In Taoism, the
absolute is knowable not through logic, but through intuition. Taoism’s
central tenet is to surrender to the Tao and let it act through oneself. This
is called wu wei, which is best translated as “not doing” [McCormick,
1999].
Like Confucianism, Taoism also addressed the subject of good
government. Taoism advocated that the best rulers were those who
interfered the least and instead let the Way determine the natural outcome
of things. Historians of economic thought have often noted Taoism’s
remarkable laissez faire implications, so many centuries before Smith
[McCormick, 1999]. What course might Chinese history have taken had
Taoism become its dominant philosophy? Unfortunately, the question is
moot, since it was Confucian philosophy that won out in the long run.
Confucianism came to act as the “glue” which defined Chinese
civilization and bound it together, though the Mencius (a work reiterating
many Taoist concepts) did become a part of the Confucian canon
[Roberts, 1999, 18].
The Warring States period closed with another milestone for
Chinese history: the unification of China under the first emperor, Qin Shi
Huangdi. The name “China” comes from the name of this first imperial
dynasty, the Qin or “Chin”. The Qin dynasty came from the kingdom
which finally conquered the other warring states in the 220’s BC. The
Qin economy was strengthened a century earlier by reforms which gave
it a free market in land usage, boosting agricultural output and the wealth
of the state. This advantage, combined with skilled warcraft and the
ability to raise large, well organized armies allowed the Qin to crush all
opposition within a few decades [Roberts, 1999, 18-22].
Li Si, the emperor’s chief advisor, initiated reforms based on
Legalist philosophy. Legalism was a school of thought in opposition to
Confucianism; it advocated that good leaders should direct their policies
for the good of the state, not the people. Li Si attempted to standardize
weights, measures and to build roads. Despite these actions, the Qin
dynasty was damaged from its start by the emperor’s execution of
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hundreds of Confucian scholars who had criticized him. These scholars
were already forming a growing intellectual elite within China, and this
action helped hasten rebellions against the dynasty’s authority [Roberts,
1999, 22-26].
After his death, Qin Shi Huangdi was buried in a magnificent
funerary complex. When parts of this tomb were excavated in the 1970’s
over 7000 life-size terra-cotta soldiers were found in pits, as well as a
jade-plated burial suit intended for the emperor. The first emperor’s
dynasty collapsed just a few years later under peasant-led rebellions,
having lasted barely a generation. Liu Bang, one of the peasant generals
who had rebelled against the Qin, was able to take the imperial throne,
styling himself huangdi (sovereign emperor) and taking the name Gaozu
[Roberts, 1999, 25-27].
The Han dynasty which Liu Bang founded came to define the
Chinese imperial system which continued off and on for the next twothousand years. It was claimed that the emperor held the “mandate of
heaven” (a concept dating as far back as the Zhou period) as justification
of his dynasty’s reign. Its bureaucracy was composed at least partially of
Confucian scholars or Confucian-educated noblemen to administrate the
empire. Finally, its economy was
[Based on] intensive cultivation involving sophisticated
techniques of irrigation and seed selection; an economic
interdependence in which a free peasantry produced a
marketable surplus of primary goods, and supplemented its
income through domestic handicrafts; and an economic
vulnerability to natural disasters and the encroachment of
landlordism and state exactions. [Roberts, 1999, 29].
As a land empire, China would be harassed throughout its history by
horse-riding tribesmen from the central Asian steppe. During Han times,
this threat was posed by a group known as the Xiongnu. It was extremely
hard for the infantry-based armies of the Chinese to decisively defeat the
horsemen, who could always retreat back into the steppe for refuge.
Some of these horse tribes even came to rule part or all of China at
different times (Roberts, 1999, 28-30). This contributed to the “dynastic
cycle,” one of the main recurring themes in China’s history.
In the dynastic cycle, a new family rose to the throne, as the Han
did, through able leadership during the times of rebellion and unrest
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which marked the previous dynasty’s fall. Over time, the new dynasty
unraveled due to its own problems, rebellions increased again, and
another family took the mandate of heaven. The Han dynasty did not
completely disintegrate for four centuries, lasting from 206 BC to 220 AD
(Roberts, 1999, 28-30).
Han China is often compared to the world’s other great iron age
civilization: Rome. According to J.A.G. Roberts:
Both empires extended to the limits of the known world, both
recorded remarkable technological achievements, both
developed sophisticated administrative and legal systems, and
both enjoyed a similar span of power until their collapse.
Similarities have also been found in the explanation for their
fall: the rise of privileged families owning vast estates; the
degeneracy of the imperial line and factionalism at court; and
an ideological failure, precipitated in the Roman case by the
rise of Christianity, in China by the attraction of popular
Taoism. Both empires were threatened by ‘barbarian’ tribes
on their frontiers and both made the fatal error of allowing
these ‘barbarians’ to settle within their boundaries [Roberts,
1999, 39].
Roman civilization was replaced by Germanic tribes who became
Christianized, giving birth to medieval Europe and it’s institutions,
leading eventually to the modern western world. It took centuries for
classical Greek and Roman writing and philosophy to be rediscovered and
popularized in Europe, and then only what had survived in religious
monasteries. However, classical Chinese civilization-as embodied by
Confucian literature and the imperial institution-never really went away.
Each time the imperial system broke down it eventually came back
together [Roberts, 1999, 39]. This is seen as the great strength of Chinese
civilization but ironically, as it will be shown, it was also perhaps its
undoing.
The empire was effectively dissolved from 220-589 AD during what
is called the Period of Division. Independent kingdoms with ever-shifting
borders controlled different parts of China and separate dynasties ruled
the north and south during the latter half of this period. In the late 6th
century, the Sui dynasty (quickly replaced by the Tang in the early 7th
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century) reunited the Celestial Empire, as China had become known
(Roberts, 1999, 40-48).
It was during Tang times that Chinese culture spread throughout east
Asia to countries like Korea and Japan (a country which had only recently
turned to agriculture from hunting and gathering). The Chinese
pictographic writing system and Confucian literature became a shared
cultural heritage in these countries, giving rise to the historical label of
the “East Asian Cultural Sphere” for this situation (Roberts, 1999, 66-69).
The Tang dynasty lasted from roughly 617-906 AD but its
accomplishments are outside the scope of the larger discussion of China’s
divergence from the West. so we will skip forward a bit, to reach the meat
of our discussion.
UNFULFILLED PROMISE
The period of division following the disintegration of the Tang lasted
only half a century. In the 960’s AD, the Song (or Sung) dynasty
emerged under a usurping general who had been employed by the last of
the five dynasties which had ruled north China during the interim. Under
the Song, China would take some of its greatest technological and
economic strides, far outdistancing those of Europe, which was still a
backwater of the world, compared to the lands of Islam and China. It has
been said that an impartial observer of the Earth’s peoples, picking a
“winner” at the turn of the first millennium AD would have
overwhelmingly chosen China, due to its leadership [Roberts, 1999, 8384].
Politically, the Song confirmed the examination system begun under
the Tang as the most important entrance into the imperial bureaucracy,
though the purchase of office or family connection still remained another
avenue for entry. Under this system, candidates for office were required
to pass a rigorous examination in Confucian philosophy in order to
qualify for acceptance into the bureaucracy. The degree they earned on
the examination determined their rank. This would prove to be an
important step, for it may have initially helped China’s progress,
providing a pool of administrators many of whom were intelligent and
learned.
These bureaucrats became known as “mandarins” and the
bureaucracy became referred to as the mandarinate, at least in western
sources [Roberts, 1999, 85-88].
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The great economic change during the Song dynasty primarily took
the form of increased agricultural output. This growth in output came
from three intertwined sources. First, there was a vast shift in population
from north to south China. Second, this demographic change was coupled
with a change in the Chinese staple crop from the wheat and millet grown
in the northern plains toward rice agriculture, for which southern China
was well suited. Third, a substantial amount of technological diffusion
in agriculture increased the productivity of farmers as well [Elvin, 1973,
113-130].
The growth in rice cultivation in the south made it an especially
receptive time for a leap in productivity. Wet-field rice agriculture is a
capital-intensive activity by its nature. Rice-growing in Southern China
has a drier climate than southeast Asia and rice-growing required the
construction of wet “polder” fields, continual irrigation and large amounts
of manure. The invention of better hydraulic capital-devices such as the
noria (a water-wheel with clay pots at the periphery) and the moveable
pallet-pump translated into increased productivity [Elvin, 1973, 113-130].
There was also an end during Song times to the Tang dynasty’s
attempts to enforce the “equitable field system” of land distribution, in
which the government distributed public land to the peasantry. A “free”
market in land usage gradually replaced this system, and large agricultural
manors became the norm in much of the country. According to economic
historian Mark Elvin, this system of “manorialism without feudalism”
was not universal in China but was widespread in the rice-growing south,
probably because only large manors could afford the necessary capital
improvements [Elvin, 1973, 73-82].
An interesting side-note is that the growth of manorial systems in
both Europe and Japan resulted in the development of a professional
warrior class to protect the manor. In Europe these were the knights; in
Japan, the samurai. These classes tended to usurp political power and
impose a significant amount of inefficiency on their societies, which was
especially true in Japan under the Tokugawa shogunate. This did not
happen in China, where central authority was never replaced by true
feudalism, which leaves one to wonder again why China ultimately lost
its lead over Europe. However, as we will see later, there seem to be
some advantages to the disunity which accompanies feudalism.
In addition to agricultural growth, Elvin also identified
improvements in water transportation both at sea and in a system of
internal canals completed during the Song dynasty. There was a great
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increase in the supply of copper, and with it the availability of currency
for market transactions. Money lending also increased, allowing easier
capital flows for investment and commercial ventures. Market activity,
internal trade and regional specialization developed to an unprecedented
scale, probably due to the increased ease of water transport which linked
rural and urban areas [Elvin, 1973, 113-199; Roberts, 1999, 87-88].
Finally, Elvin (and many other scholars) have noted the incredible amount
of technological invention going on in China, centuries ahead of the rest
of the world in many cases.
Joel Mokyr, a technological historian, compiled a lengthy list of
“precocious” Chinese inventions during the Tang, Song and Yuan
dynasties. Included are the agricultural inventions already mentioned but
there is much more: magnificent water clocks constructed during the
tenth and eleventh centuries; advanced sailing technologies, including
better ship design, navigation methods and sails; the use of gunpowder
in rockets, catapult bombs and possibly even firearms; mine drilling;
porcelain; the use of the blast furnace in iron production (a full thousand
years before Europe); and printing. This is just an incomplete list, but it
gives the reader an idea of just how far ahead the Chinese were,
technologically and economically, at the start of the first millennium
[Mokyr, 1990, 209-218].
Technological invention and diffusion still continued after the Song
dynasty declined and fell to another wave of steppe horsemen. First, the
Jurchen Jin conquered northern China in the first quarter of the 12th
century which split the country in two, though the Song still ruled in the
south. A century later, Ghengis Khan and the Mongols destroyed the Jin
dynasty and swept into southern China a generation afterward under
Ghengis’ grandson, Khubilai. In the process, the Celestial Empire
became a part of the enormous land empire the Mongols created, which
covered virtually all of mainland Asia and parts of the Middle East and
eastern Europe [Roberts, 1999, 94-109].
Khubilai adopted the role of Chinese emperor in addition to his
position as khaghan or “Great Khan” of the Mongols. The Mongol reign
over China is known as the Yuan dynasty and lasted a little over a century
and a quarter. Zhu Yuanzhang, the man who became the first Ming
emperor, came from peasant origins to lead rebel bands during the a wave
of rebellions at the end of the Yuan dynasty. He took advantage of the
breakdown of Yuan control created by declining Mongol fortunes in
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China and across Asia and seized the throne in the 1360’s [Roberts, 1999,
119-122].
A REVERSAL OF TRENDS
It is now that the story of China changes dramatically. There is no
set demarcation line where the growth in productivity under the Song and
Yuan “ended,” but the pace of China’s technological (though not
economic) growth gradually slackened and finally stopped altogether. It
happened at some point during the Ming dynasty and persisted during the
Qing (Ching) dynasty which replaced it in the 1640’s. Europe and China
began to diverge after the Industrial Revolution, and by the early 19th
century the gap between east and west was glaring [Landes, 1998, 344346].
Growth in the Smithian sense continued. China was filling up in
population and intensifying against fixed land and resources and there
was no accompanying change in productivity to “save the day” [Elvin,
1973, 298-316]. This took centuries, to be sure, but eventually China
turned off the path of a vigorous and proud empire ahead of its time onto
a road of increasing poverty and overcrowding. It was a situation ripe for
the predatory ambitions of the imperial European powers who had grown
tired of sending ambassadors to be condescended to by the imperial court
and who had grown powerful with their new armaments and tools
[Landes, 1998, 335-340].

II. Why Did China Fall Behind?
Answers to the perplexing question of China’s divergence from its
own promising future and from the West are hard to come by. However,
there are plenty of recurring themes among the theories which scholars
have developed to explain this problem. Untangling the threads of
causation is the difficult part.
More than anything else, the institutions of the Celestial Empire
seem to have created a number of problems for the emergence of western
style “capitalism” in China and for technological invention similar to that
seen in industrial Europe. Though they lent Chinese civilization a certain
durability, they ended up bogging it down as well. In short, the imperial
institution was to blame, starting with the bureaucrats.
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According to Joel Mokyr, technological change in China even at its
height was largely a top-down process:
In the great agricultural expansion of the Middle Ages,
government played a central role in the coordination of
hydraulic projects and the dissemination of technical
information. Officials wrote and published books on farming
and promoted the adoption of faster-ripening and more
drought-resistant strains of rice… Wang Chen and Hus Kuang
Chhi, the authors of massive treatises on framing, were
government bureaucrats. As early as the Han period (221 BC
to 220 AD) the government provided peasants with the capital
they needed for agricultural improvements, including tools and
draft animals…
A millennium later, the Sung [Song]
government offered financial incentives to farmers to invest in
improvements… the government also played a major role in
the development of transport technology and the diffusion of
medical knowledge [Mokyr, 1990, 233-234].
So the government would promote the sort of internal improvements
that would bring increased tax revenue or internal trade. However the
imperial system might be interested in technical improvement to a certain
point but it would not tolerate the upheaval associated with major
inventions and their accompanying innovation [Mokyr, 1990, 232].
To Mokyr and other scholars, Europe was too fragmented for any
one state to have “market power” over ideas. Persecuted inventors could
flee to a more open-minded area where they would be allowed to enrich
themselves through their idea. European governments were not only
unable to stop technological progress, they were generally unwilling.
Many new ideas were simply too useful to monarchs with international
rivalries and a thirst for gold. For example, better math and astronomy
allowed for better navigation at sea, and opened up the possibility of
obtaining the Eastern goods which Europe craved. So the possibility for
thinkers and tinkerers to obtain refuge and protection remained [Mokyr,
1990, 223].
Mokyr himself points out that this “openness” resulting from
Europe’s decentralized character should not be exaggerated. Certainly
there are historical examples of government and the church sitting on
ideas in Europe. This was especially true in times when the two
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institutions were so closely wed, during the Reformation and CounterReformation. Giordano Bruno, an ex-monk whose vision of the universe
was centuries ahead of its time, was burned alive in Rome in 1600.
Gallileo Galilei was placed under house arrest thirty years later for
sticking to his own notions about planetary motion [Landes, 1998, 181182]. Despite the frequently hostile intellectual climate which
nonconformists faced, their ideas survived and were improved upon by
later thinkers and inventors [Mokyr, 1990, 233].
China was different. There was little of the outright religious
persecution and bigotry to be found in Europe, but there was a subtler
discouragement of frontier-pushers. Generally speaking, China tended to
be a “top-down” civilization in terms of initiative. So a disinterested
bureaucracy and powerful trading guilds may have quashed useful ideas
that threatened to redistribute income or power away from them. As a
result, the productivity advantages of innovation was overlooked and lost.
This blocking influence prevented or delayed the adoption of inventions
in mining and transport, soybean-oil pressing and silk reeling [Mokyr,
1990, 233].
The very existence of the mandarinate may illustrate another factor
in Chinese culture which indirectly stifled technological development:
through diversion. Education and scholarship were desirable goals in the
traditional Confucian ethical canon, and the bureaucracy had become an
entrenched institution in China. Entering it was widely seen as a path to
both material success and prestige; something for better-off families to
strive for [Landes, 1998, 335-336].
The Chinese venerated their intellectual ancestors, and there were
schools to teach Confucian literature and morals to those studying for the
imperial examinations. This cultural bias toward education would seem
beneficial in light of the desirable effects of education on an economy.
Unfortunately, it proved to be a diversion of creative energies away from
where they “should” have been. Bureaucratic activities are not the stuff
of which an industrial revolution is built, and as a result there was very
little organized (or even unorganized) scientific inquiry going on [Landes,
1998, 343].
It is true that pre-modern technological invention was not
necessarily linked to the systematic process that we call “science.” It was
mostly empirical in nature, a process of trial and error and of brilliant
mistakes which could be turned to useful ends [Mokyr, 1990, 229-231].
So pre-modern technology usually progressed a bit at a time; through the
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tinkering of craftsmen, the pondering of philosophers and the celestial
observations of diviners, priests and early astronomers. The development
of printing in both Europe (in the 1400’s) and China (four-hundred years
earlier) changed this and allowed new ideas to be transmitted much more
easily than through hand-copying (Elvin, 1973, 179-181; Mokyr, 1990,
217-219).
So at some point networks of knowledge beyond the encyclopedias
of Europe and China became extremely advantageous to further scientific
inquiry and progress. In pre-industrial Britain, this took the form of the
Royal Society which was chartered by James II in 1662 for the purpose
of advancing English science. This organization not only counted the
luminary Sir Isaac Newton among its founding members but held
meetings and contests and published its findings. Europe also had its
universities, whether they took the form of the navigation school founded
by Prince Henry of Portugal, the halls of Oxford or France’s Ecole
Polytechnique. These sorts of institutions were able to bring together
ideas and talents, and to transmit news about what was already known
[Landes, 1998, 343-345]. This was vital.
China lacked this. As Landes puts it: “The history of Chinese
advances, then, is one of points of light, separated in space and time,
unlinked by replication and testing, obfuscated by metaphor and pseudoprofundity, limited in diffusion (nothing comparable to European
printing)-in effect, a scattering of ephemera” [Landes, 1998, 343]. There
were plenty of marvelous inventions in China, especially during Song
times and there was plenty of writing on technical subjects, from farming
to mathematics. Many of the inventions went unappreciated, unused and
were quickly forgotten. In time, the books went unread and were lost to
fire or just bad storage. Little was built on work which had come before.
So in the end the institution of a merit-based mandarinate which seems so
appealingly democratic on the surface probably hurt China [Landes, 1998,
343-345; Mokyr, 1990, 220-221].
Consider a single example: the magnificent water-clock built in
1086 AD by Su Sung for the Song court, centuries before the Europeans
had anything like it. According to Mokyr it was probably the most
advanced water-driven clock ever built, forty feet high and displaying
various astronomical/astrological positions in addition to the time. Rather
than exploit the useful applications of Su Sung’s masterpiece or the
water-clocks which had come before it, the courtiers seem to have
regarded the device as a novelty. After all, time and the calendar in China
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were the emperor’s prerogatives to “give.” By the 16th century, no one in
China remembered that such a device had even existed [Mokyr, 1990,
214-15, 220].
The issue of clocks also provides a segue into a related issue:
Chinese contact with Europeans. If technological progress had slowed in
China by the late Ming dynasty, then why didn’t the Chinese hungrily
devour European knowledge when the Portuguese traders came calling in
the 16th century? Ironically, the Jesuits who accompanied the traders
gained audience with the bureaucrats and the court by bringing examples
of mechanical European clocks to show them, but the Ming, like the
Song, viewed these as toys, not tools (Landes, 1998, 336-337).
This seems to be another symptom of a Chinese worldview which
had become complacent and convinced of its own glory. The Celestial
Empire was, after all “…first in age and experience, untouchable in its
cultural achievement and sense of moral, spiritual and intellectual
superiority” [Landes, 1998, 335]. The new European devices were
interesting and might well be useful, but China did not need them. And
so the Ming Chinese ignored Europe’s steadily increasing lead, with the
exception of asking the Jesuits to teach their artisans to make clocks and
cast cannon, which they installed in their fortresses and some of which
were still around to be used in the 1840’s against the British. They also
adopted New World crops like the potato to feed their hungry population,
but this was the extent of their borrowing, at least until much later
[Landes, 1998, 335-340].
The inward-looking character of Ming China was nothing new, but
it had not always been so. Between 1405 and 1430 the dynasty had sent
the eunuch admiral Cheng Ho on a series of voyages as far west as the
east coast of Africa. Cheng Ho’s fleet included over three hundred
vessels (some of which were more than 400 feet long) and 28,000 men.
Then the court lost interest and China turned its back on exploration
[Landes, 1998, 93-95] .
After the mid 15th century the Ming even constricted all overseas
trade until only a trickle of legal commerce entered China through treaty
ports like Portuguese. China believed that it didn’t really need trade after
the construction of the grand canal linking the north and south, so why
maintain a navy to protect it? Why even allow sea-trade at all? As a
result, resources which could have been wiser spent elsewhere were
shifted to fighting the smugglers and pirates who sprang up in the face of
this self-imposed embargo (Elvin, 1973, 215-222).
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So China forfeited the chance to launch its own age of exploration
like that which Europe embarked upon half a century later. As morally
repugnant as it is from our “modern” standpoint, European colonialism
allowed for a diffusion of knowledge back to the continent and a growth
of long-distance trading networks. This may have been an important step
on the road to industrial revolution. It was colonialism which opened up
lands suitable for sugarcane production and cotton. Colonialism also
provided new crops like the potato which increased European food
production on marginal land. Colonialism eventually opened up new
markets for Experimentation and contact with other cultures may even
have allowed Europeans to learn ways to conserve their soil resources and
prevent further erosion at home [Landes, 1998, 68-71; Pomeranz, 2000,
9-10, 57-59].
Was it complacency which prevented the Chinese from doing the
same? There was certainly no need in China to seek a route to the West.
The Europeans had nothing to offer. So the voyages of Cheng Ho ended
up as an expensive public relations tour; a way to show the flag and
display Chinese superiority to the barbarians beyond the Celestial Empire
[Landes, 1998, 94-95].
Even the philosophy of the period had become introspective. The
dominant Chinese thought of the day is represented by the moral
intuitionism school popularized by Wang Yang-ming in the 16th century.
Scholars often cite this development as yet another stumbling block to
effective scientific progress. Wang Yang-ming essentially taught that
nothing existed outside the mind, and that discovering moral principles
and truth was a process of looking within oneself. Compare this to the
Neo-Confucianism popular during the Song era which stressed discovery
of the underlying principles of the natural world [Elvin, 1973, 224-234].
Neo-Confucianism was a shift away from the traditional Chinese outlook
to begin with. The Chinese spiritual outlook did not share the European
belief in a personal god. The Chinese believed that manipulating the
environment for human benefit was desirable, but not to the degree which
European society encouraged. The general tendency in China was to see
a balance between people and nature as desirable; there may have been
a less aggressive drive to harness the discoveries which were made and
to push for innovation which would make them practical [Mokyr, 1990,
227-229].
Worldview aside, China came very close to starting an industrial
revolution, based on the reports we have about the scale of economic
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output during the key period. Were they lacking one or two key
inventions to complete the “process?” Kenneth Pomeranz thinks that the
Chinese failure to harness fossil fuels for energy may have been a
contributing factor. Recall that north China was the empire’s “political,
economic and demographic center of gravity” until the 12th century. The
region was devastated by the coming of the Jurchen and the Mongols,
civil wars and natural disasters between the years 1100 and 1400 which
permanently shifted the country’s leadership to the south [Pomeranz,
2000, 62-63].
The warfare and depopulation wrecked the advanced iron industry
and coal mines of the north. As a result, there was a technological
regression in both activities resulting from the lost human and physical
capital. This may have had even worse long-term effects for China, since
the north also contains most of the country’s coal deposits [Pomeranz,
2000, 62-63].
Coal fell out of favor as a fuel source in iron production until the
18th century, when the government tried to promote mining again. This
was unsuccessful, owing partly to the fact that the mining rights were
given to poor farmers, but according to Pomeranz “it seems unlikely that
even better capitalized mines would have achieved the major
breakthroughs needed to transform China’s energy, transport and metals
sectors…” This may also have hurt Chinese chances of adopting a device
known to them which was vital to the industrial revolution in Britain: the
steam-engine [Pomeranz, 2000, 58-64].
Chinese mines were dry, but in Britain mines were wet and needed
to be pumped out. The first inefficient steam-engines proved to be a
labor-saving tool in mining, since the mines they pumped provided the
abundant fuel necessary to run them. Further experimentation led to
innovation and the steam-engine’s eventual role as the central
transportation technology of the industrial revolution. It is debatable
whether use in mining was the definitive cause of the European adoption
of the steam-engine, but centuries had been lost in China along a path
which might have yielded a similar breakthrough [Pomeranz, 2000, 5864].
In the meantime, the empire had fallen into a Malthusian trap, its
resources strained by overpopulation. Why didn’t an industrial revolution
occur as a “response” to this pressure? After all, the technological
slowdown which has already been described did not necessarily prevent
this from happening. The Chinese still had many of the right pieces in
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place, in light of the European experience. They had spinning machines
which were just a step in complexity behind the spinning jenny of the
British textile industry [Mokyr, 1990, 209-218]. They had huge markets
right at home in need of clothing and the other fruits which the industrial
revolution bore in Britain. There was plenty of commercialization in the
Yangze delta, though wage bills were steadily rising as food and fuel
grew expensive [Elvin, 1973, 298-316].
So why weren’t the sort of capital improvements which would have
made the Chinese labor force more productive in the 17th and 18th
centuries adopted? Mark Elvin proposed his theory of a “high-level
equilibrium trap” in the 1970’s to explain this puzzle. His idea was that
the intensification of population versus output had led to virtually no
capital surplus by the 18th and 19th centuries and that this made investment
in such capital-intensive inventions too expensive [Elvin, 1973, 298-316].
Other scholars have criticized the theory as being counter-intuitive,
since it seems logical that such intensification would lead someone to
profit from the development of labor-saving device and since some of the
population pressure was relieved by plagues which may have wiped out
35% of China’s population in the 17th century [Mokyr, 1990, 225-226].
Then again, as metal and wood became so expensive, why build
machines? Labor was still relatively cheaper.
The China which greeted the European imperialists of the 19th
century seemed a very backward place to them indeed. It was an
overcrowded country where people lived hand-to-mouth and famine and
pestilence were always waiting in the wings. The Chinese made their
livelihoods in much the same way as their ancestors had at the turn of the
millennium, but in those days they had been the envy of the world. It was
a bitter pill to swallow for the proud people of the Celestial Empire.
III. Conclusion
In the end, there was no one direct cause for China’s failure to live up to
its own promise. Rather, the events discussed here seem to have had a
cumulative effect upon the course of Chinese economic history which
pushed it off a course which might have led to an industrial revolution.
It is important to remember that each of those major causes discussed
above was affected in turn by hundreds of other factors.
However, a large share of what happened is attributable to
significant differences in the character of the European and Chinese
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civilizations. The larger social institutions in China, particularly those
under the Ming and Qing dynasties, caused significant distortions in
incentives and inventiveness which were compounded by other problems
that prevented China from industrializing. Laying the blame on these
institutions clashes with that of many China scholars.
To them, it is Europe’s success which is the anomaly in need of
explanation, not China’s failure, if it is in fact a failure [Landes, 1998,
346-349]. Perhaps this is true, but China’s awe-inspiring record of
technical achievements during the middle ages and its subsequent
slowdown begs an explanation. So far, many of the best answers seem to
point toward its centralized nature, which allowed a shift in attitudes
among the imperial elite to turn the entire nation toward isolationism.
Once on that path, China chose to ignore European gains, favoring
complacency instead.
New comparisons of the specific pre-industrial factors in both China
and the west, such as Kenneth Pomeranz’s The Great Diversion, still
deserve further attention and may yield new perspectives on this very
difficult and important problem. It is difficult because of the problems
inherent in working from any historical record, which is always a
patchwork of surviving documentation and the findings of archeologists.
It is important because finding the answers will tell us much about the
accuracy of the economics profession’s models of the role of technology
in macro-economic growth. Understanding this problem also allows us
to understand the motives of a China which is rapidly reasserting itself on
the global stage. In short, this is a subject which may prove vital to our
understanding of how to raise the standards of living for the poor nations
of the world and vital to diffusing tensions between China and the West.
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